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Semi-presidentialism – where the constitution provides for both a directly 
elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet collectively 
responsible to the legislature – is now an increasingly common form of 
government. Particularly since the fourth wave of democratization in 
1990, many countries, particularly notably in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the former Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa, have adopted a semi-
presidential constitution (Elgie, 2007). One of the most recognisable 
features of semi-presidentialism is cohabitation – where there is a 
president from one party and a prime minister from an opposing party 
and where the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. This 
term was first used to describe the situation in France from 1986-88 when 
the socialist president, François Mitterrand, shared power with a right-
wing government led by prime minister Jacques Chirac. Since this time, 
many semi-presidential countries have experienced cohabitation. Indeed, 
for some countries, such as Mongolia, Poland, and Portugal, cohabitation 
has now become a common feature of the political process. 
For many observers cohabitation is the Achilles Heel of semi-
presidentialism. When the president and the prime minister, via the 
assembly, can both claim to be the legitimate source of political authority, 
then in young democracies the scene is set either for deadlock between 
the two camps, perhaps encouraging the military to intervene to break the 
stalemate, or for either the president or the prime minister to seize power 
unilaterally. Kirschke (2007) has provided evidence to suggest that 
cohabitation has indeed been damaging to democracy in sub-Saharan 
African countries. Indeed, in Niger what might be called a ‘textbook’ case 
of cohabitation coincided with the collapse of democracy in 1995 
(Villalón and Idrissa, 2005). In Franceconsolidated democracies, 
cohabitation has neverdoes not posed a threat to the democratic system, 
but it was verycan  unpopular among the political class at least and it did 
cause tensions within the executive.. As a resultIn France, the constitution 
was amended in 2000 to decrease the likelihood of cohabitation in the 
future. In short, whether or not cohabitation is ultimately destructive of 
democracy, it certainly poses problems of coordination within any 
executive. Therefore, understanding the dynamics conditions under which 
of cohabitation is most likely to occur is an important political 
questionissue. 
To date, there have been scarcely any systematic cross-national 
studies of cohabitation. Certainly, in individual cases there has been plenty 
of analysis, perhaps most notably in France where the topic has been 
studied in considerable detail, though predominantly by constitutional 
lawyers (e.g. Cohendet, 1993). There are also plenty of case studies that 
refer to the consequences of cohabitation as part of a more general 
narrative about the development of the political system.  However, the 
only truly cross-national comparison to date can be found in Samuels and 
Shugart (20092010). As part of a broader project on presidents, prime 
ministers, and parties, they provide descriptive statistics showing that 
cohabitation is much more prevalent in countries with the premier-
presidential sub-type of semi-presidentialism than in those with the 
president-parliamentary sub-type (ibid., chap. 2). That said, while Samuels 
and Shugart clearly identify the general regime typeinstitutional 
framework in which cohabitation is most likely to occur, they do not 
explore the more specific conditions under which it can be foundis found. 
As a result, there are plenty of questions that remain unanswered. Within 
a given regime type, is cohabitation merely the stochastic result of 
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exogenous political factors such as the party system, or is it endogenous 
to particular institutional arrangements, such as the electoral timetable 
such as separately scheduled legislative and presidential electionselectoral 
arrangements? This might give the impression we’re going to include 
electoral systems.  Under what types of electoral conditions is 
cohabitation most likely to be found? What is the relationship between 
presidential power and the frequency of cohabitation? 
In this article, we are not concerned with the duration 
consequences of cohabitation or its duration. Instead, we aim to identify 
the electoral conditions that are most likely to be associated with the 
onset of cohabitation. First, we identify necessary, or virtually necessary, 
conditions for cohabitation. Then, we propose some probabilistic 
hypotheses about the conditions under which cohabitation is more likely. 
We identify the conditions under which cohabitation is most likely to 
occur. We then test the validity of theseour hypotheses on the basis of a 
new data set that records every case of cohabitation in all semi-
presidential electoral democracies from 1989-2008 inclusive. We 
employOur analysis is a combination of descriptive statistics and logistic 
regression. We find that cohabitation is strongly associated with particular 
types of electoral electoral situations. We also find that the onset of 
cohabitation is often associated with the interaction of certain types of 
electoral situations and the degree of presidential power in a country. 
 Overall, our findings have important policy implications. We 
show that cohabitation can generally be avoided with the adoption of 
certain constitutional rules. We also find that the conditions under which 
cohabitation is most likely to occur are also the ones where it is most 
easily managed. Thus, even though we do not study the effects of 
cohabitation directlywhile cohabitation remains a distinct possibility under 
given institutional arrangements, our findings strongly imply that 
cohabitation is not likely to benecessarily as problematic as the existing 
literature would suggest. 
 
Semi-presidentialism and cohabitation 
The definition of semi-presidentialism has long been a source of debate. 
In this article, we use the definition that is now standard (Elgie, 1999, 
2007a; Samuels and Shugart, 2010; Shugart, 2005; Skach 2005) A country 
has a semi-presidential constitution when there is both a directly elected 
fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet collectively 
responsible to the legislature. The key point to note about this definition 
is that there is no requirement thatfor the mention of a president to 
having to havehave “quite considerable powers” (Duverger, 1980, p. 166). 
In other words, there is no behavioural element to it. The advantage of 
such a definition is that, when deciding which countries are semi-
presidential, we do not have to make a subjective judgment call as to what 
constitutes “quite considerable powers”. We simply need to read the 
constitution. 
While the definition of semi-presidentialism has been contested, 
Whatever definition we use, semi-presidentialism is inextricably linked 
with the notion of cohabitation. Cohabitation is more than the situation 
where representatives from different parties hold the two main positions 
within the executive. For example, cohabitation is not where one coalition 
party holds the presidency and another coalition party holds the 
premiership. Instead, cohabitation is the situation where a president from 
one party holds power at the same time as a prime minister from an 
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opposing party and where the president’s party is not represented in the 
cabinet. Given there are two sources of legitimacy under semi-
presidentialism – the presidential election and the parliamentary election – 
there is always the potential that one political force may win one election 
and that an opposing force may win the other. Thus, the potential for 
cohabitation is always present under semi-presidentialism. For this reason, 
debates about the pros and cons of semi-presidentialism always involve at 
least some discussion of the effects of cohabitation. 
 The most common argument in favour of semi-presidentialism is 
that it can allow for a degree of power-sharing between opposing forces 
(Moestrup, 2007). One party can occupy the presidency, another can 
occupy the premiership and, thereby, both can have a stake in the 
institutional system. In their work, Samuels and Shugart (20092010) 
provide a variant of this argument. They state (ibid., chap. 9, p. 79337): 
“… the most important potential advantage [of the premier-presidential 
sub-type of semi-presidentialism] is the prospect of cohabitation, which 
does not necessarily offers parties not the ‘best of both worlds’ 
simultaneously, but at least a offers the possibility to oscillate between the 
presidential and parliamentary worlds …”. For Samuels and Shugart, 
therefore, the institutional flexibility of semi-presidentialism is an 
advantage. This flexibility expresses itself through the potential for a shift 
from a unified executive to cohabitation. To use their terms (ibid., p. 338), 
the “parliamentarization” of the system under cohabitation can act as a 
counterweight to the presidency. 
 The strength of Samuels and Shugart’s argument lies in the fact 
that it results from a rigorous empirical study. However, they are almost a 
lone voice in their support of cohabitation. The standard wisdom is that 
cohabitation is problematic. For example, Stepan and Suleiman (1995, p. 
399) see “the possibility of constitutional conflict between two electorally 
legitimated executives [as] the central problem [of semi-presidentialism]”. 
Fabbrini (1995, p. 133) states that “[h]erein lies the main weakness of 
semipresidentialism: the possibility of a rift between the president with his 
popular majority and the premier with his legislative majority. Such a split 
could hamper or even paralyze the executive”. Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 
286) are more explicit still: “When supporters of one or the other 
component of semi-presidentialism feel that the country would be better 
off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would 
disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers 
an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other will 
tend to consider the political system undesirable as long as the side they 
favor does not prevail … [I]n a semipresidential system, policy conflicts 
often express themselves as a conflict between two branches of 
democracy”. 
 For these writers cohabitation can be harmful for the very 
survival of democracy. However, in consolidated democracies too 
cohabitation is often a source of dissatisfaction. This is seen most clearly 
in France. The first experience of cohabitation from 1986-88 “did not 
produce a fundamental political or constitutional crisis”, but it did 
produce “severe strains between the president and the prime minister” 
(Pierce, 1991, p. 287). President Mitterrand refused to sign certain 
government decrees; he returned a number of government bills to 
parliament for further consideration; and the prime minister encroached 
upon the president’s ‘reserved domain’ of foreign and defence policy. The 
third period of cohabitation from 1997-2002, which began just two years 
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into President Chirac’s seven-year term, was even more “devastating” 
(Quermonne, 2007, p. 6) in that it “progressively slowed down the 
government’s work and placed France’s external relations in a difficult 
position, as witnessed in European affairs by the unfortunate Treaty of 
Nice” (ibid.).  The political response was the introduction of the five-year 
presidential term in 2000 and the de facto synchronisation of presidential 
and legislative elections. For those in favour of this constitutional reform, 
the desire to avoid cohabitation was the “main benefit” (Bigaut, 2000, p. 
11) to that would accrue from it. 
Overall to summarise, cohabitation has been the source of considerable 
academic and political debate. To date, this work has overwhelmingly 
focused on the effects of cohabitation. It has shown that cohabitation can 
have important positive or, more usually, negative consequences. In short, 
it has been shown that cohabitation matters. In this article, we have a 
different aim. We wish to identify the conditions under which 
cohabitation is most likely to occur. Specifically, with what type of 
electoral conditions is cohabitation most likely to be associated? If we can 
identify regularities in the onset of cohabitation, then we can place the 
debate about the effects of cohabitation – good or bad – in its 
appropriate institutional context. 
 
Cohabitation in semi-presidential electoral 
democracies 
We define cohabitation as the situation where a president from one party 
holds power at the same time as a prime minister from an opposing party 
and where the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. 
Whatever the party composition of the cabinet, if either the president or 
the prime minister is non-partisan or independent, then we do not class 
this as a case of cohabitation. To determine the party identification of the 
president and prime minister, we rely on the affiliations recorded in 
www.worldstatesmen.org. This is a reliable source and it standardises such 
affiliations as far as possible. To determine the party composition of 
cabinets, we use secondary sources, including publications such as Africa 
Research Bulletin, and the European Journal of Political Research 
Political Data Yearbook. 
 We identify every occurence of cohabitation in all countries with 
a semi-presidential constitution that are recorded as electoral democracies 
by Freedom House to 2008 inclusive. Their time series for electoral 
democracies goes back to 1989 inclusive.  While we could have increased 
our units of observation by using data sets with longer time series, for 
example, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World democracy scores or 
Polity IV scores, we rely on the electoral democracy classification partly 
because the time series is long enough to capture the increase in the 
number of semi-presidential countries after 1990 and also because we do 
not have to impose a cut-off point as to what score constitutes the 
threshold above which a country can be classed as a democracy. For the 
purposes of this study, therefore, iIf a country with a semi-presidential 
constitution is classed as an electoral democracy, then we include it in our 
data set. If such a country is first classified as an electoral democracy 
some time after 1989, we only record it only from the year when it 
achieved this status. If a country loses the status of an electoral 
democracy, then we cease to include it in our data set. However, if the 
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same country is reclassified as an electoral democracy at a later date, then 
we record it in our data set from that year on. 
 In our data set, the basic unit of observation is an electoral 
period. This comprises the time between a presidential or parliamentary 
election. Each unit of observation is a potential period of cohabitation. 
Given Wwe are not concerned with the duration of cohabitation, only 
with whether or not cohabitation occurs in the first place. Therefore, we 
treat each electoral period, whatever its length, as one unit of observation, 
For example, Slovenia adopted a semi-presidential constitution in 
December 1991. However, it is first classed as an electoral democracy in 
1992. So, our observations begin with the 1992 elections. PHere, 
parliamentary and presidential elections were held simultaneously on 6 
December 1992. The next election was a parliamentary election in 
November 1996. There was then a presidential election in November 
1997, a parliamentary election in October 2000, a presidential election in 
November 2002, a parliamentary election in October 2004, a presidential 
election in November 2007 and a parliamentary election in September 
2008. This gives us eight units of observation for Slovenia (1992-1996, 
1996-1997, 1997-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2006, 2006-2007, 
2007-2008, and 2008-). Among this set, there is one period of 
cohabitation from 2004-2006. During this period, the president, Janez 
Drnovšek, was from the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) party, 
whereas the prime minister, Janez Janša, was from the Slovenian 
Democratic Party. The latter headed a four-party coalition in which the 
LDS was not represented.  In the other seven units of observation for 
Slovenia either the president was classed as non-partisan or the 
president’s party was represented in the government. We should add that 
if cohabitation begins mid-way through an electoral period, we record this 
as a new period of observation. Similarly, if cohabitation ends prior to an 
election, we record a new unit of observation spanning the period from 
the end of cohabitation to the next electoral contest. In all, we have 2186 
units of observation, including 42 43 units, or periods, of cohabitation.  
Table 1 lists the countries that are included in the study, the periods when 
they have been classed as electoral democracies and whether they have a 
president-parliamentary or premier-presidential sub-type of semi-
presidentialism (see H5 below). Table 2 lists se the periods of 
periodscohabitation in these countries. Table 3 lists periods of non-
partisan presidencies in these countries. There are 44 units of observation 
with non-partisan presidents. We present relevant descriptive statistics 
hypothesis by hypothesis. 
[Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
 
  
The measurement of democracy is a matter of major controversy (Adcock 
and Collier, 1999; Munck and Verkuilen, 1999; Przeworski et al., 2000, 
pp. 14-28).  Datasets defined by democratic criteria are often open to the 
criticism that the use of a different measure would have substantially 
affected the composition of the sample and produced very different 
empirical results.  In order to confront this issue, we demonstrate the 
external validity of our samplechoice of states by comparison with the 
work of Samuels and Shugart (2009).  Their work is excellent for this 
purpose in that they have also tried to compile comprehensive cross-
national data on cohabitation but have used quite a different approach to 
choose countries and periods to study.  To date, the only study that has 
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tried to identify all periods of cohabitation on a cross-national basis is 
Samuels and Shugart (2009). Their rules for case selection are slightly 
different from those in this article. They include countries only when they 
have scored at least +5 on the Polity IV scale for at least five consecutive 
years in the period from 1945-2007 inclusive (ibid., chap. 2, p. 38). Also, 
they identify the incidence of cohabitation on the basis of the total 
percentage of years that semi-presidential democracies have experienced 
this situation. Given that we include three smaller democracies that are 
not part of the Polity IV data set (Cape Verde, Iceland, and São Tomé e 
Príncipe), that we have a different timeframe, and that we calculate the 
incidence of cohabitation differently, we begin our study by replicating 
Samuels and Shugart’s finding that cohabitation is more likely in countries 
with a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism than in those 
with a president-parliamentary form. Recall that under premier-
presidentialism the government is responsible solely to the legislature, 
whereas under president-parliamentarism the government is responsible 
to the president as well.   Their study raises operational issues in the 
classification of a handful of countries, which we discuss in detail in the 
appendix.  Our external validity test takes the form of a logit of 
cohabitation as predicted by the effective number of political parties and 
regime sub-type. (Please see tabletable one.)  The party system is usually 
seen as a crucial determinant in government formation.   Moreover, 
Lijphart, in denying the coherence of a semi-presidentialism as a regime 
type, has interpreted cohabitation as a party-system-induced shift from a 
presidential to a parliamentary system (Lijphart, 1999, p. 106).  We 
hypothesise that cohabitation is unlikely if there are very few or very 
many parties, and therefore include the square of the number of parties. 
The result (table two, model one) reproduces Samuels and Shugart’s 
finding that cohabitation is associated with premier-presidentialism, 
butalbeit at a relatively unimpressive level of statistical significance.  This 
result in model one is driven by the very influential outlying case of São 
Tomé.  This small African country of 160,000 was excluded from Samuels 
and Shugart’s study by Polity’s size criterion.  There were four periods of 
cohabitation in São Tomé between 1994 and 2005.  There was only one 
other case of cohabitation in a clearly presidential-parliamentary regime: 
Sri-Lanka 2001-2004.  If we exclude São Tomé, as in model two, the 
relationship between premier-presidentialism and cohabitation is, 
predictably, much stronger.  Indeed, the relevant coefficient is over three 
timestwice as large.  We conduct the rest of our analyses without São 
Tomé and can, therefore, be confident that our results are not 
epiphenomena of our democratic criterion. 
Replicating Samuels and Shugart’s study, we find that only 11 of the 42 
(26.2%) periods of cohabitation occurred in president-parliamentary 
countries (one in Austria, five in Iceland, four in São Tomé, and one in 
Sri Lanka). These descriptive statistics confirm the general tendency of 
their study. However, there is a discrepancy between our basic findings 
and the Samuels and Shugart study (ibid., chap. 2, p. 54) in that they 
identify only one period of cohabitation under president-parliamentarism 
(Sri Lanka). There are two reasons for this difference. Firstly, we include 
Iceland and São Tomé, neither of which are part of the Polity IV data set 
on which Samuels and Shugart base their study, but both of which 
experience numerous periods of cohabitation. Secondly, Samuels and 
Shugart classify Austria behaviourally as a “parliamentarized president-
parliamentary regime” (ibid., chap. 3, p. 106). They argue that, while 
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constitutionally Austria has a president-parliamentary form of semi-
presidentialism, the president’s power, by convention, is so weak that “… 
Austrian politics does not follow the formal configuration of power its 
constitution outlines …” (ibid., chap. 3, p. 107). Their solution is to 
exclude Austria from their list of cohabitations.  The same logic can 
certainly be applied to Iceland, where, for the same reason, “it is 
customary … to regard the form of government as a parliamentary one” 
(Kristinsson, 1999, p. 86). In this article, we are not concerned with 
comparing parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. 
Therefore, rather than excluding Austria and Iceland, we reclassify both 
countries as premier-presidential (i.e. as semi-presidential countries where, 
albeit by convention, the president does not dismiss the government). 
This is consistent with the logic of Samuels and Shugart’s study. 
Reclassifying Austria and Iceland as premier-presidential, we then employ 
a logit model to test whether cohabitation is statistically more likely under 
premier-presidentialism than under president-parliamentarism. Coding 
periods of cohabitation as 1 and all other units of observation as 0 and 
controlling for the effective number of parliamentary parties, model 1 
shows that the semi-presidential sub-type is still only a poor predictor of 
the onset of cohabitation, being barely significant even at the 10% level. 
(See Table 2). However, when we exclude São Tomé, model 2 produces 
the same result as Samuels and Shugart; premier-presidentialism is a 
strong predictor of the onset of cohabitation relative to president-
parliamentarism. 
[Table 2 about here] 
To date there has been only one attempt to capture the full set of 
cohabitation periods in semi-presidential democracies. Samuels and 
Shugart’s (2009) study showed that cohabitation was more likely under 
premier-presidential countries than president-parliamentary countries. 
However, they did not try to explain the onset of cohabitation in any 
more detail, preferring instead to focus on broader issues relating to the 
relative performance of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential 
democracies. Using a different data set, we have replicated Samuels and 
Shugart’s and come to the same result, albeit after reclassifying Austria 
and Iceland as de facto premier-presidential and excluding São Tomé.  
In the rest of this article, we fill the gap left by Samuels and Shugart and 
explore in more detail the electoral conditions under which cohabitation 
is likely to occur. We test whether there is support for our hypotheses 
using descriptive statistics and logistic regression models. When we use 
logit models we reclassify Austria and Iceland as premier-presidential and 
exclude São Tomé. In so doing, we ensure as far as possible that our 
results are not being driven simply by our case selection procedures. 
 
Explaining the onset of cohabitation 
We assume that cohabitation is likely to occur underUnder what 
conditions certain electoral conditions.is cohabitation likely to occur? 
 The first condition is the absence of a majority for the president’s 
party in the legislature. While we would hesitate to raise this or any 
condition to that of a true ‘sociological law’, we can certainly treat it as a 
de facto necessary condition for cohabitation. By definition, under semi-
presidentialism the government is responsible to the legislature. If the 
president is partisan and if the president’s party has a majority in the 
legislature, then it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which 
the president’s party would not be represented in the government. Any 
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attempt to install a government without the president’s party would result 
in it being voted out of office by the presidential majority. So, 
cohabitation will, inevitably, be associated with situations where the 
president’s party fails to enjoy the support of an absolute majority in the 
legislature. 
H1 Cohabitation will occur when the president’s party has less than 
50 per cent of the seats in the legislature 
Unsurprisingly, the empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. We 
calculated the percentage of seats held by the president’s party in each of 
the units of observation and we found that all of the periods of 
cohabitation occurred when the president’s party failed to enjoy majority 
support in the legislature. For example, in Portugal the Socialist party won 
the parliamentary election in February 2005, returning 52.6 per cent of the 
total number of deputies to the legislature and forming a single-party 
government. At the time, the incumbent president was Jorge Sampaio, 
also representing the Socialist party. So, there was no cohabitation. 
However, in January 2006 Aníbal Cavaco Silva, representing the centre-
right Social Democratic party, won the presidential election. The Social 
Democrats enjoyed the support of 32.6 per cent of deputies in the 
legislature that had been elected the previous year. With the socialists still 
enjoying an absolute majority there, the government did not change and a 
period of cohabitation began. This example clearly shows that the onset 
of cohabitation was associated with the shift from a situation where the 
president’s party enjoyed majority support in the legislature to one where 
the president’s party was in a minority. 
 In generalWhile cohabitation is almost inconceivable in situations where 
the president’s party enjoys majority support in the legislature, these 
situations are relatively uncommon. In fact, in our data set the president’s 
party enjoyed the support of an absolute majority in the legislature in only 
40 of 218 observations (18.3 per cent) in total and in 40 of the 175 
observations (22.9 per cent) that remain when we exclude the 
observations where the president was non-partisan, and where, by 
definition, the president’s party could not enjoy majority support. 
Therefore, while the absence of an absolute majority for the president’s 
party in the legislature is a necessary condition for cohabitation, we still 
need to identify the circumstances in which cohabitation occurs when the 
president’s party does not enjoy majority support there. 
In this context, we begin by noting that cohabitation cohabitation can 
occur as a result of three types of electoral situations: when synchronised 
presidential and legislative elections return opposing majorities; when a 
presidential election returns a candidate whom who is in opposition to the 
incumbent legislative majority (as in the previously cited Portuguese 
example) opposes; and when a legislative election returns a majority that 
is opposed to the incumbent president (as happened in France in 1986, 
1993, and 1997). The only other situation under which we would observe 
cohabitation is if it were to occur mid-way through an electoral period. 
We hypothesise that this latter scenario is highly unlikely. It Cohabitation 
could occur if the president’s party were to ito withdraw unilaterally from 
the government. However, all else equal, the president’s party is unlikely 
to do so because it would leave the president totally alone within the 
executive. Cohabitation It could also occur if the incumbent government 
was voted down by the legislature and if a new government was formed 
that excluded the president’s party. However, the president’s party is 
unlikely to withdraw unilaterally from the government because it would 
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leave the president totally alone within the executive. MoreoverHowever, 
if the legislature were to vote down a government that included the 
president’s party, it is likely that the president would still be able to avoid 
cohabitation. By virtue of his/her popular legitimacy, the president likely 
eithermay be in a position to insist on his/her party being included in the 
new government, or to requireto require a non-party technical 
government. Alternatively, the president may decide, or to dissolve the 
legislature rather than accept an unexpected period of cohabitation and 
potential loss of influence. So, while cohabitation can occur outside an 
electoral context, it is very unlikely to do so. 
H1H2 Cohabitation only occurs after elections. 
 The experience of cohabitation in semi-presidential electoral 
democracies from 1989-200Our data set 8 strongly supports this 
hypothesis. Only two two of the 42 43 units cases of cohabitation 
occured began mid-way through an electoral period: in Romania from 
April 2007 until the election of -December 2008 and in São Tomé e 
Príncipe from March 2004 until the president’s party rejoined the 
government in June 2005, and São Tomé 2004-2005 (Since ST is being 
excluded from the logits maybe we should exclude it from descriptive 
statistics too). The Romanian case illustrates the exceptional 
circumstances that need to combine to lead to cohabitation occurring in 
this wayoutside an electoral context. Following the 2004 legislative 
election, President Băsescu’s Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) was part of 
the governing coalition led by Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu of the 
National Liberal Party (PNL) and that including included the PNL, the 
PD-L and two other parties. However, relations between the president 
and prime minister deteriorated so much that in April 2007 Prime 
Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu proposed a cabinet reshuffle that excluded 
the PD-L ministers from the new government (Stan and Zaharia, 2008, p. 
1120). A couple of weeks later parliament voted to impeach President 
Băsescu, accusing him of authoritarianism. In May a referendum was held 
to validate the impeachment vote. Turnout was relatively low, but the 
vote was overturned. Both the president and the government remained in 
office and cohabitation continued until the legislative election in 
December 2008, but the fact that the onset of cohabitation mid-way 
through an electoral period coincided with parliament voting to impeach 
a president and a referendum on the president’s survival in office shows 
that this scenario is likely to be associated with only an exceptional 
political situation. ThereforeOverall, we can concludeour findings provide 
overwhelming support for the proposition that cohabitation is 
overwhelmingly likely to follow an election.  
 Given cohabitation is highly unlikely to occur outside an electoral 
context, the question arises as to whether particular types of elections are 
more or less likely to lead to cohabitation. In this regard, we can 
hypothesise that cohabitation is unlikely to occur when presidential and 
parliamentary elections are synchronised. For cohabitation to occur under 
such conditions, there would have to be considerable split-ticket voting. 
While presidential elections are necessarily majoritarian, the legislative 
election would have to return a coherent majority that was actively 
opposed to the president. This is possible, but unlikely. As outlined 
abovenoted previously, the Frenchin France changed the length of the 
president’s mandate was changed deliberately to minimise the future 
likelihood of cohabitation. By contrast, in 2003 the president’s term in 
Romania was increased from four to five years. Previously, presidential 
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and parliamentary elections had been held simultaneously with the former 
acting as a “trailblazer” in terms of government selection (Tănăsescu, 
2008, p. 69). By ‘desynchronising’ the elections, tThe 2003 reform was 
not designed specifically to encourage cohabitation, but it was passed with 
a view to reducing the pre-eminence of the president in the political 
process, which is consistent with the general effect of cohabitation. 
H2H3 Cohabitation will not occur when presidential and legislative 
elections are synchronised. 
 Again, the descriptive statistics are sufficient to provide strongly 
support for this hypothesis. Excluding the two cases where cohabitation 
occurred outside an electoral period, we have 214 observations, each of 
which begins with an electoral contest. In 51 50 of our 218 observations 
(223.82.9 per cent%) of these observations presidential and legislative 
elections were held within three months of each other. For example, in 
Mozambique, Namibia and Romania (until 2008) the constitution 
specified simultaneous elections. In other countries, simultaneous (or 
quasi-simultaneous) elections were simply a function of the electoral 
timetable, as with the above case of Slovenia in 1992. However, none of 
these 51 50 observations resulted in cohabitation. In other words, the 
evidence strongly suggests that cohabitation is overwhelmingly likely to 
occur after a ‘mid-term’ election, that is to say following a legislative 
election that occurs at some point during a president’s term or following a 
presidential election that occurs at some point during a legislature’s term. 
 We have already shown that cohabitation is unlikely ever to be 
associated with the situation where the president’s party enjoys an 
absolute majority in the legislature. By the same logic, even when the 
president’s party does not enjoy majority support, we would expect 
cohabitation to be less likely when the president’s party has more support 
in the legislature than when the president’s party is only a small force. 
True, if there was a two-party system, then the president’s party could win 
a very large minority of seats in the legislature and cohabitation could still 
occur because the opposition would have a majority. However, all else 
equal, if the president’s party has a very large minority of seats, then it is 
highly likely the president’s party will be an indispensable part of the 
coalition-building process, thus ensuring that cohabitation is avoided. By 
contrast, if the president heads a party with little support in the legislature, 
then, even though the president may have considerable personal 
legitimacy by virtue of being directly elected, the parliamentary arithmetic 
may mean that the president’s party is not required for the construction 
of a stable legislative majority. 
H4 When the president’s party does not have majority support in the 
legislature, cohabitation is less likely to occur as the share of the seats held 
by the president’s party increases 
  To test this hypothesis, we perform a logistic regression of 
cohabitation as predicted by the share of the seats held by the president’s 
party in the legislature when the seat share is 50 per cent or less. The 
sample also excludes non-partisan presidents. The mean presidential share 
was almost 31 per cent, with a standard deviation of 13, a minimum of 
zero and a maximum, by construction, of fifty. Unsurprisingly, as Table 4 
shows, we find that this variable is quite powerful, explaining over eleven 
per cent of the variation in this sample. The presidential share has an 
obvious substantive importance. For example, the model predicts that if 
the seat share of the president’s party in the legislature were to fall from 
thirty to twenty per cent the probability of cohabitation would rise from 
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0.29 to 0.44, an increase of over fifty per cent. In all subsequent models, 
we restrict the sample to cases where the president’s party did not enjoy 
more than 50 per cent of the seats in the legislature. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 In their recent book, Samuels and Shugart (2010) have shown 
that cohabitation is more likely to be associated with the premier-
presidential sub-type of semi-presidentialism than with the president-
parliamentary sub-type. The difference between the two sub-types is 
constitutional: under president-parliamentarism the president has the 
power to dismiss unilaterally the prime minister, whereas under premier-
presidentialism this power is absent. Samuels and Shugart (ibid., chap. 2) 
argue that parties are more likely to be presidentialised under the 
president-parliamentary sub-type due to the importance that is placed on 
winning the presidency. Given presidents have greater influence over 
legislative parties under this sub-type (ibid., p. 55), there are likely to be 
greater opportunities, they argue, for presidents to avoid cohabitation 
than under premier-presidentialism. Samuels and Shugart provide a ready-
made hypothesis for us to test. Moreover, they also provide us with an 
excellent opportunity to test the external validity of our findings. This is 
because they use the same definition of semi-presidentialism and 
cohabitation as this study, but they also use quite different case selection 
criteria when compiling their cross-national data set and they calculate the 
incidence of cohabitation differently. They include countries only when 
they have scored at least +5 on the Polity IV scale for at least five 
consecutive years in the period from 1945-2007 inclusive (ibid., chap. 2, p. 
40). Also, they identify the incidence of cohabitation on the basis of the 
total percentage of years that semi-presidential democracies have 
experienced this situation.  If we can replicate their finding about the 
greater likelihood of cohabitation in countries with a premier-presidential 
sub-type of semi-presidentialism, then we can identify a further condition 
under which the onset of cohabitation is likely to occur and we can also 
have confidence in our findings more generally. 
H5 Cohabitation is more likely in countries with a premier-
presidential form of semi-presidentialism than in those with a president-
parliamentary form 
 To test this hypothesis we conduct a logit of cohabitation as 
predicted by the sub-type of semi-presidentialism controlling for the share 
of the president’s party’s seats in the legislature. The result (Table 5, 
Model 1) fails to reproduce Samuels and Shugart’s finding that 
cohabitation is associated with premier-presidentialism. However, the 
result is driven by the very influential outlying case of São Tomé e 
Príncipe, which has a president-parliamentary form of semi-
presidentialism. This small African country of 160,000 inhabitants was 
excluded from Samuels and Shugart’s study by Polity’s size criterion. 
There were four periods of cohabitation in São Tomé e Príncipe between 
1994 and 2005. However, in our sample there was only one other case of 
cohabitation in a president-parliamentary regime: Sri-Lanka 2001-2004. If 
we exclude São Tomé e Príncipe, eighty one per cent of the observations 
are premier-presidential and the balance, of course, are president 
parliamentary. As Table 5, Model 2 shows, the coefficient for premier-
presidentialism more than doubles in size and reaches statistical 
significance. Holding presidential share at the mean for this sample (30 
per cent), a premier-presidential regime has a 0.34 probability of 
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cohabitation, while a presidential-parliamentary regime has a probability 
of less than 0.04. 
[Table 5 about here] 
These results suggest that the premier-presidentialism has a large and 
direct impact on the likelihood of cohabitation. However, it is also 
possible that premier-presidentialism may be associated with a lower seat 
share for the president’s party. Given we have just demonstrated that this 
is a necessary condition for cohabitation, premier-presidentialism’s effect 
on cohabitation may be indirect, biasing our estimates of the direct effects 
of premier-presidentialism. To address this possibility, we conducted a 
number of Heckman probit models, which tested the effect of these two 
different causal channels from regime sub-type to cohabitation. In no 
version was there evidence that a single-equation structure like that 
presented in Table 5 would bias estimates of the effect of premier-
presidentialism. Thus, we can be confident that premier-presidentialism 
has a direct impact on the likelihood of cohabitation. From this point on 
we control for regime sub-type, but, when we do so, we exclude São 
Tomé e Príncipe. 
 As we have shown, cohabitation is highly unlikely to follow a 
mid-term election. Teither a stand-alone presidential election or a stand-
alone legislative electiohe question, therefore, remains as to which 
whether it is more likely to be associated with a presidential election that 
occurs at some point during a legislative term or with a legislative election 
that occurs at some point during a presidential termof these elections is 
more likely to be associated with the onset of cohabitation. All else equal, 
we assume that cohabitation is more likely to follow a mid-term legislative 
election than a mid-term presidential election. If cohabitation follows a 
mid-term legislative election, then even if the president has the power to 
dissolve the legislature then this power is unlikely to be available 
politically because an immediate dissolution would be likely merely to 
confirm the result of the previous legislative election. As a result, the 
president will have to accept a period of cohabitation before, in practice, 
the power to disolve becomes operational. By contrast, if cohabitation 
follows a mid-term presidential election, then the a president can who has 
the power to dissolve the legislature will immediately dissolve the 
legislaturedo so with in the hope of returning a pro-presidential majority 
or at least avoiding a pro-opposition majority. This was the strategy 
adopted by President Mitterrand in France following his election in 1981 
and his re-election in 1988. Moreover, even if the president does not have 
the power to dissolve the legislature, mid-term presidential elections often 
provide the opportunity to reshape the party system, breaking old 
alliances and encouraging new coalitions. Therefore, a newly elected 
president may be able to forge a workable majority or at least avoid a 
hostile majority even without a legislative election. 
H3H6 When cohabitation follows an election, it is more likely to follow 
a legislative election than a presidential election 
 This time the logistic regression does not support the 
hypothesisIn order to test this hypothesis, we add a dummy variable for 
legislative, as opposed to presidential, elections – 63 per cent of the 
observations were legislative elections and the rest were presidential. We 
also control for the sub-type of semi-presidentialism and for the share of 
the president’s party’s seats in the legislature. The results do not support 
this hypothesis. Model 34 in Table 3 shows that the coefficient is in the 
wrong direction and does not approach significance. (See Table 6). There 
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are plausible reasons why the simple hypothesis may does not work. In 
semi-presidential countries, pPresidential elections are often held under a 
two-ballot system. Under such a system, the eventual winner may be well 
short of a plurality at the first ballot, but may still win a plurality at the 
second ballot when faced with a controversial opponent. In such a case, 
the president’s party may perform only weakly at the subsequent 
legislative election and cohabitation may ensue. In addition, in some 
democracies presidents may have considerable personal appeal, but they 
may have only a weak and ambivalent relationship with political parties. 
Again, this may mean that they are popular, whereas their party remains 
only a minor political force. 
 [Table 3 6 about here] 
 While these reasons may account for why the simple hypothesis 
fails, we focus on the interaction between the power of the president and 
the type of election to explain the likelihood or otherwise of cohabitation. 
One of the consequences of a purely constitutional definition of semi-
presidentialism is that the list of semi-presidential countries includes 
countries with weak presidents as well as those with strong presidents. We 
hypothesise that when cohabitation follows a presidential election it is 
more likely to do so if the president is weak. So far, we have assumed that 
cohabitation matters. However, if the president is weak, then cohabitation 
may not figure as a political issue at all. Parties may organise to win the 
presidential election simply because they are office-seeking, but policy-
seeking political competition will focus predominantly on the outcome of 
the legislative election. In these cases, the presidential election is, in effect, 
a second-order election. Ireland is a good example. Here, the term 
‘cohabitation’ is absent from the political vocabulary, even though there 
have been occasions when the president has been from a party that has 
not been represented in government. In Ireland the president is a 
figurehead position. Very occasionally the president may express a 
different opinion from the government, usually on social issues (Tavits, 
2009). For the most part, though, the presidency is a ceremonial office. 
While presidential elections are sometimes uncontested, usually when a 
popular incumbent is willing to stand again, they are the object of political 
competition and, on occasions, the competition has been fierce, notably 
in 1990 (O’Sullivan, 1991). Whatever the intensity of the presidential 
competition, the election to the lower house of the legislature is the 
overwhelming focus of political activity. As a result, we may observewhile 
cohabitation following may result from a presidential election, but the 
outcome will be largely, if not totally, irrelevant to the political 
classdecision-making process. Thus, even if parties want to win the 
presidential election, there are few costs to losing it and, hence, few costs 
to cohabitation. The same is not true in a country where the president has 
real constitutional powers. 
H4H7 When cohabitation follows a presidential election, it is more 
likely to do so when there is a weak president 
 To test this hypothesis, we measure presidential power as a 
continuous variable using Siaroff’s (2003) measure, which runs from zero 
to eight.  In the sample for Model 5, Table 7 the mean Siaroff score is 
almost three with a standard deviation of over two and a range of zero to 
six.  We first show that, while the relationship between presidential power 
by itself and cohabitation is in the right direction, the finding is not 
significantbut the coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant. 
(See, Table 7 Mmodel 45, Table 4)We then interact presidential power 
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with the type of election. We then restricted the sample to presidential 
elections.  Since there was no variation in cohabitation amongst 
presidential-parliamentary countries with this restriction, with the 
exception of the outlier São Tomé. , we have dropped the regime variable.  
When we do so, we find that the hypothesis is strongly supported. (?) The 
resulting analysis strongly supports our hypothesis: the presidential power 
coefficient is almost ten times larger and is now statistically significant. 
(See Table 7, Table 5Mmodel 56, table 4). The restriction to presidential 
elections and premier-presidentialism removes over sixty per cent of the 
observations, but only seven of the twenty-six countries. The mean in this 
sample is 2.5, a little lower than for Model 5. Again, the model’s 
implications are substantively noteworthy. Holding presidential share at 
the sample mean of 29 per cent, a regime with maximum presidential 
power has a 0.29 probability of cohabitation, rising to 0.91 if the 
constitution scores the minimum for presidential power. More subtle 
shifts are also predicted to have a profound effect on cohabitation. 
Reducing the presidential power from one to two reduces the probability 
of cohabitation by 0.06.  Descriptive also statistics help to us illustrate 
these findings. Specifically, we find  that cCohabitation follows a 
presidential election on 15 14 occasions. We find that São Tomé, with a 
Siaroff score of 7, experienced cohabitation after its 1996 presidential 
election. However, we find that the country with the highest Siaroff score 
that experienced cohabitation following a presidential election was pre-
reform Finland in 1994 with a score of 4.  also Generally, we find that 
when cohabitation followed a presidential election it did so 
overwhelmingly in countries with weaker-than-average presidencies, such 
a:s Austria (adjusted Siaroff score of 0), Iceland (0), Ireland (1), Slovakia 
(1), Bulgaria (2), Lithuania (3), Mongolia (3), Poland (2), and Portugal (2). 
[Table 7 about here] 
Thus, while we find no support for the simple hypothesis that 
cohabitation is more likely to follow a legislative election, we find strong 
support for the proposition that the onset of cohabitation is indeed at 
least partly determined by the type of election. When cohabitation follows 
a presidential election, it is much more likely to do so in a country with a 
weak presidency than in one with a strong presidency. 
 
The effect of cohabitation and the conditions under which it occurs 
 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether semi-presidentialism constitutes 
a good constitutional choice. Central to this debate is the impact of 
cohabitation. While there is some support for the idea that cohabitation 
can have positive benefits, most observers believe that cohabitation is 
problematic. In this article, we have not examined the effects of 
cohabitation directly. Even so, our findings add to the debate about the 
pros and cons of cohabitation and to the debate about semi-
presidentialism generally. 
 We have confirmed the finding from Samuels and Shugart (2010) 
concerning the effect of regime type on the incidence of cohabitation. 
Countries with the president-parliamentary sub-type of semi-
presidentialism are much less likely to experience cohabitation than those 
with the premier-presidential sub-type. This finding is not driven by the 
greater presence of non-partisan presidents in the president-parliamentary 
countries in our data set. While non-partisan presidents are common in 
such countries generally, often they are common in countries that are not 
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classed as electoral democracies. Therefore, these countries do not enter 
our data set in the first place. Indeed, in our sample 25 of the 44 
observations with non-partisan presidents were found in premier-
presidential countries. (See Table 3). This suggests that if the 
overwhelming aim of constitution-makers is the desire to avoid 
cohabitation, then semi-presidential countries should adopt a president-
parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism. That said, studies have 
shown that president-parliamentarism is also much more likely to be 
associated with democratic collapse and with a lower quality of 
government (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Elgie, 2007; Elgie and 
McMenamin, 2008; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). In this article we have 
shown that synchronised presidential and legislative elections, or quasi-
synchronised elections, where both elections are held within three months 
of each other, are a very effective way of avoiding cohabitation even 
under a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism. Thus, we have 
shown that opponents of president-parliamentarism and cohabitation can 
have the best of both worlds – premier-presidentialism plus synchronised 
elections makes it very unlikely that cohabitation will occur. 
  Most observers believe cohabitation to be problematic. While we 
have not examined the effects of cohabitation directly, our findings imply 
that cohabitation may be less problematic than the received wisdom may 
suggest. For most scholars cohabitation is associated with problems of 
executive coordination. We have not tested for the direct effect of 
cohabitation in this regard, but our rsults provide indirect evidence to 
believe that cohabitation may not be as problematic as the folk wisdom 
might suggest. We have shown that cohabitation is very unlikely to occur 
outside the context of an election. Given democracies rest on the 
legitimacy of the electoral process, the fact that cohabitations 
overwhelmingly follow elections suggests that cohabitation is likely to be 
seen as a legitimate element of that process, albeit perhaps an unwanted 
one. If cohabitation is seen as legitimate, then the main political actors – 
president, prime minister, legislature – are likely to work within the 
framework with which they have been presented rather than undermining 
it. This does not mean that there will be an unexpected outbreak of 
political harmony, but it does suggest that actors will respect the 
boundaries of the constitutional process. The French experience of 
cohabitation strongly supports this proposition. No-one among the 
political class was very happy with cohabitation. Everyone wanted sole 
authority. However, the election result meant that this was not possible. 
Therefore, while the president was willing to intervene in a way that made 
the decision-making process more complex than had previously been the 
case, there was no legislative gridlock. The president did not try to dismiss 
the prime minister against the wishes of the majority. The majority did 
not refuse to propose a prime minister or refuse to cooperate insisting on 
the resignation of the president. So, even though we have not tested for 
the effect of cohabitation on executive coordination, our findings suggest 
that any problems of coordination will occur in a context in which the 
main political actors are likely to respect the basic rules of the admittedly 
unusual game with which they are faced. 
 Building on this point, we have also shown that potentially the 
most problematic scenario in which cohabitation can occur – following a 
presidential election – is unlikely to be a source of contestation. Under 
semi-presidentialism, as under presidentialism, a general worry is that a 
president will rely on his/her personal authority and rule by decree, so 
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undermining the legislative majority (Skach, 2005). We might imagine that 
if a newly-elected president is unable to dissolve an opposition legislature 
and immediately faces a period of cohabitation, then even in a 
consolidated democracy the incentive for the president to act unilaterally 
in order to pursue his/her legitimate mandate may be overwhelming. The 
result may not be the collapse of democracy, but it could be the 
polarisation of the political process, leading to inefficient decision-
making. While the personalisation of presidential power may well be a 
general problem under semi-presidentialism, particularly under its 
president-parliamentary sub-type, we have found that it is unlikely to be a 
problem that results from cohabitation. We have shown that when 
cohabitation follows a presidential election, it is likely to do so in 
countries where the president is a relatively weak political actor. Indeed, 
we have found that it is often likely to do so in countries where the 
president is so weak that the concept of cohabitation is completely absent 
from the political vocabulary. 
 Overall, our findings suggest that the critics of cohabitation may 
have exaggerated its problems. We have shown cohabitation is likely to 
occur in the context where it is most easy to manage. This does not mean 
that there will not be problems of executive coordination during 
cohabitation. It merely means that such problems are likely to occur in 
the most benign context possible. Thus, the negative impact of 
cohabitation may not be as great as the received wisdom would have us 
believe. 
 
Conclusion 
Semi-presidentialism is closely associated with cohabitation. For most 
observers, cohabitation is a problem. In new democracies its effects can 
be so devastating that the process of democratisation itself may collapse. 
In consolidated democracies, it can lead to problems of executive 
coordination and legislative gridlock. In this article, we have provided the 
first systematic exploration of the conditions under which cohabitation is 
likely to occur. Cohabitation only occurs when the president’s party fails 
to enjoy majority support in the legislature. In this context, we have 
confirmed that it is more likely to occur in countries with a premier-
presidential form of semi-presidentialism. We have also shown that it is 
more likely to follow an election, and that it is likely to follow an election 
that occurs mid-way through a parliamentary or presidential term. We 
have also shown that when cohabitation follows a presidential election, it 
is likely to do so in a country where there is only a very weak president. 
Together, these findings have important policy implications. If 
constitution-makers wish to avoid cohabitation at all costs, then we have 
identified a very clear strategy that maximises the chances of doing so. 
However, we have also suggested that there is perhaps less need to be 
concerned about cohabitation than the received wisdom would suggest. 
We find that the conditions under which cohabitation is most likely to 
occur are also the ones under which it is likely to be most easily managed. 
By itself, this finding does not provide support for semi-presidentialism. 
However, it does suggest that one of the most oft-cited problems of 
semi-presidentialism is less serious than the folk wisdom would suggest.  
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Table 1 Semi-presidential electoral democracies, 
1989-2008 inclusive 
Country Years included in 
data set 
Sub-type of semi-presidentialism 
Armenia 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Croatia 
 
Finland 
France 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
1999-2002 
1989- 
1992- 
1991- 
1991-2000, 2005-2007 
1992-1996 
1991- 
 
1989- 
1989- 
1994-2002, 2005- 
1995-1999, 2006- 
1989- 
1989- 
1993- 
1992- 
1993- 
 
1992- 
2007-2008 
1995-2000 
1992- 
2006- 
1994- 
1990- 
president-parliamentary 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary (to 2000) 
premier-presidential (from 2001) 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential (to 1995) 
president-parliamentary (from 1996) 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
president-parliamentary 
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Source for electoral democracies: Freedom House 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 
– accessed 9 February 2010) 
Niger 
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
São Tomé e Príncipe 
 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sri Lanka 
Taiwan 
Timor-Leste 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
1993-1996, 1999- 
1989-1991, 2001- 
1991- 
1989- 
1992- 
1993-2003 
1991- 
 
2000- 
2006- 
1999- 
1992- 
1989- 
1996- 
2002- 
2007- 
1994- 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
president-parliamentary (to 2002) 
premier-presidential (from 2003) 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary 
president-parliamentary 
premier-presidential 
premier-presidential 
president-parliamentary (to 2006) 
premier-presidential (from 2007) 
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Table 2 Periods of cohabitation in semi-presidential 
electoral democracies, 1989-2008 inclusive 
 
Country Period of cohabitation to end 2008 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Finland 
France 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Mongolia 
Niger 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
São Tomé 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sri Lanka 
2004-2007 
1995-97, 2001-2002, 2002-2005 
1991-94, 1994-95, 2007- 
1993-95, 1997-2002 
1996-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-
2004, 2004-2007 
1990-92, 1997 
1996-98, 2003-2004 
2002-2004, 2006-2008, 2008- 
1993-96, 1997-2000 
1995-96 
1991-93, 1993-95, 1997-2000, 2000-2001, 
2007- 
1987-91, 1991, 1991-95, 2002-2005, 2006- 
2007-2008 
1994-96, 1996-99, 1999-2001, 2004-2005 
2006-2007 
2004-2006 
2004-2006 
2001-2004 
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Table 3 Units of non-partisan presidencies in semi-
presidential electoral democracies, 1989-
2008 inclusive 
 
Country Non-partisan presidents to end 2008 
Armenia 
Central African 
Rep. 
Croatia 
 
East Timor 
Iceland 
 
Lithuania 
 
Macedonia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Moldova 
Russia 
 
São Tomé 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
Ukraine 
1999-2002 (president-parliamentary) 
2005-2007 (president-parliamentary) 
2000-2003, 2003-2005, 2005-2007, 2007- 
(premier-presidential) 
2002-2007, 2007- (premier-presidential) 
1988-1991, 1991-1992, 1992-1995, 1995-
1996 (president-parliamentary) 
1998-2000, 2000-2003, 2004, 2004-2008 
(premier-presidential) 
1992-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-1999 
(premier-presidential) 
2002-2007, 2007- (premier-presidential) 
2007 (president-parliamentary) 
1995-1996, 1996-1998, 1998-2000 
(premier-presidential) 
1993-1995, 1995-1996, 1996-1999, 1999-
2000, 2000-2003 (president-
parliamentary) 
1991-1994, 1994-1996 (president-
parliamentary) 
2006- (premier-presidential) 
1992-1996, 1996-1997, 1997-2000, 2000-
2002, 2006-2007 (premier-presidential) 
1994-1998, 1998-1999, 1999-2002, 2002-
2004 (president-parliamentary) 
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Table 4 Logit model of presidential share and 
cohabitation 
Model 1  
Coefficient Standard Error 
Presidential share -.0646 .0194*** 
Constant 1.09 0.685 
Wald chi² 11.13*** 
Pseudo R² 0.11 
Observations 133 
States 27 
Notes: * significant at p<0.1; ** significant at p<0.05; *** 
significant at p<0.01.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
state 
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Table 5 Logit models of regime type and 
cohabitation 
Model 1 Model 2  
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Presidential 
share 
-.0603 .018*** -.0654 .019*** 
Premier-
presidentialism 
1.14 .905 2.586 1.252** 
Constant .0221 1.084 -1.287 1.185 
Wald chi² 14.01*** 12.84*** 
Pseudo R² 0.14 0.18 
Observations 133 126 
States 27 26 
Notes: * significant at p<0.1; ** significant at p<0.05; *** 
significant at p<0.01.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
state 
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Table 6 Logit model of election type and 
cohabitation 
Model 4  
Coefficient Standard Error 
Presidential share -0.0648 .019*** 
Premier-presidentialism 2.65 1.315** 
Legislative election -.223 .462 
Constant -1.227 1.18 
Wald chi² 12.5*** 
Pseudo R² .185 
Observations 126 
States 26 
Notes: * significant at p<0.1; ** significant at p<0.05; *** 
significant at p<0.01.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
state 
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Table 7 Logit models of presidential power and 
cohabitation 
Model 5 Model 6  
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Presidential 
share 
-.0664 .019*** -.08 .0225*** 
Premier-
presidentialism 
2.448 1.233** - - 
Presidential 
power 
-.044 .132 -.41 .174** 
Constant -1.018 1.285 2.295 .95** 
Wald chi² 12.75**** 14.07*** 
Pseudo R² 0.18 0.227 
Observations 126 48 
States 26 19 
Notes: * significant at p<0.1; ** significant at p<0.05; *** 
significant at p<0.01.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
state 
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